Acharei Mot Kedoshim 5759 – Gilayon #79
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Parshat Acharei Mot- Kedoshim
"…and that they may offer their sacrifices no more to the goats (se'irim)…": This refers to the demons; they are called se'irim because one's body shudders (yista'er) when one sees them. (Note similarly that crazy people see demons in the form of goats.) The phrase "no more" teaches us that the Israelites made such sacrifices in Egypt. (Ibn Ezra to Lev. 17:7; hinted at in Ibn Ezra to Lev. 16:7).
Atonement for Sins: Then and Now
"Your lips are like a crimson thread." This
refers to the crimson thread [that was tied to the goat designated to
be sent to the wilderness as atonement for the sins of
Israel]. "and your speech (midbarech) is
pleasant." This refers to the goat sent [to the wilderness
(midbar)].
The Israelites said before the Holy One Blessed Be
He: Master of the Universe, we have only the crimson thread and the
sent goat. He said: "'Your lips are like a crimson thread.' The
trembling of your lips is as beloved to me as the crimson thread."
Rabbi Abahu said about this (Hosea 14): "Instead of
bulls we will pay with our lips:" How will we pay instead of with
bulls and the sent goat? With our lips. "And your speech
(midbarech) is pleasant:" Your desert (midbar) is
pleasant, your speech is pleasant. (Midrash Rabbah to Song of Songs,
Chapter 4).
"The sent goat." Since it is an atonement for "all
of Israel," the High Priest confesses over it using the phrasing "all
of Israel, as it says "…and confess over it all the iniquities and
transgressions of the Israelites…." The sent goat atones for all
the sins in the Torah – minor and major, whether one sinned on
purpose or by accident, whether one knew that one sinned or not
– all are atoned for by the sent goat. (Maimonides, Mishneh
Torah, Laws of Teshuvah 1:2). In our day, when the Temple no longer
exists and we have no atoning altar, there is nothing left but
repentance. Repentance atones for all sins. Even regarding a
lifelong evil person who repents at the end of life, nothing of their
evil is remembered, as it says "the evil of an evil person will not
cause their failure, on the day they repent from their evil." Yom
Kippur itself atones for those who repent. (ibid. 1:3).
The Significance of the Prohibition Against Slander
by Mordechai Breuer
The phrase "I am the Lord" or "I am the Lord your
God" is characteristic of the first part of the portion of Kedoshim
(Lev. 19). In some cases it concludes a single verse, as in "You
shall each revere your mother and father, and keep my Sabbaths; I am
the Lord your God" (Lev. 19:3), and in other cases it concludes a
group of verses on the same topic, as in "You shall not steal; you
shall not deal deceitfully or falsely with one another. You shall not
swear falsely by My name, profaning the name of your God; I am the
Lord" (19:11-12). Rashi explains the connection between these two
verses as follows: "If you have stolen, you will eventually deny and
lie…you will eventually swear falsely." However, sometimes the
connection between the two verses of the group is not apparent at
first glance. In this article, we will discuss one such group:
"You shall not render an unfair decision: do not
favor the poor or show deference to the rich; judge your relative
fairly. Do not go about as a talebearer among your countrypeople. Do
not 'stand upon' (lit.) the blood of your fellow person; I am the
Lord" (19:15-16).
The conclusion "I am the
Lord" groups these two verses together. However, it is difficult to
see how the topics of talebearing and "standing upon blood" are
related to the prohibition against biased judgments.
First we shall consider the prohibition against
talebearing. According to the familiar explanation accepted by the
Sages, this prohibition is almost equivalent to the prohibition of
slander. The exact prohibition is that of "saying something
disgraceful about a fellow person, even if it is true" (Maimonides,
Hilkhot De'ot 7:2). However, there are two other explanations which,
although less well known, come closer to the plain sense of the text.
First, according to Ibn Ezra, what is being referred to here is a
talebearer who acts like Doeg the Edomite, who told Saul what
Achimelech had done to David; this in turn led to the murder of the
people of Nov, city of priests. Second, according to one opinion of
the Sages, this is a warning to a husband who spreads an evil report
about his wife (Ketubot 46a). These two explanations may seem very
different from each other, yet they have something in common: they
both concern a person who turns in an innocent person to the ruling
authority, thereby leading to that person's death. The only difference
between the explanations is in the way the killing is carried out.
What Doeg told about Achimelech was true, however, since he told this
truth to an evil authority, he led to the killing of an innocent
person. The case of the husband who spreads an evil report about his
wife is the opposite: although he speaks before a just court, he lies
to them, thus also leading to the death of an innocent person.
The general rule is as follows: One is permitted,
even commanded, to speak the truth before a just court. At the same
time, one is forbidden to speak the truth before an unjust court, and
one is forbidden to lie before a just court.
Following this line of reasoning, the plain-sense
explanation of the prohibition "Do not 'stand upon' the blood of your
fellow person" is that presented by the Targum ascribed to
Jonathan. This explanation is also found in Torat Kohanim. The
meaning of the prohibition is: It is forbidden to stand idly by while
false witnesses carry out a plot against an innocent person. Rather,
anyone possessing evidence which can counter the plot is obligated to
submit it to the court, so that bloodshed can be avoided.
According to this, the connection between the two
verses grouped together by the conclusion "I am the Lord" is quite
clear. Both of these verses seek to prevent the court, or the ruling
authority, from engaging in injustice or bloodshed. The first verse is
directed to the court, warning the judges not to make biased
judgments; the second verse is directed to anyone who submits to the
court, or ruling authority, evidence which has the power to bias the
judgment. Also included in this warning are people standing by, who,
in their avoidance of giving positive testimony about the accused,
cause the court to make a biased judgment.
It remains for us to explain the Sages' midrash, in
which they interpreted the prohibition "Do not go about as a
talebearer among your countrypeople" as meaning that it is forbidden
to slander someone even by saying something which is true. Based on
our above discussion, this interpretation seems far from the plain
sense of the text.
However, this interpretation is actually an
expansion on what we have said here according to the plain sense of
the text. Our Sages teach us something important in this midrash:
When a person says something disgraceful about
another individual, that person assumes that no harm has been done,
since the listener is not a court and has no authority to punish.
However, this is a mistaken assumptions, because the listener is part
of the human community, and there is no crueler court than the human
community. When the human community hears something disgraceful about
an individual, this in itself creates a hostile community opinion
which has more power to harm than do a hundred judges. And since the
community lacks the means by which to investigate and render a just
decision, it is liable to punish unjustly – and its punishment
is harsher than any punishment meted out by a court.
Therefore, it is not enough to prohibit saying
something disgraceful individual which is a lie about an individual.
It is even forbidden to tell the truth, since this case is also
comparable to someone who tells the truth before a cruel and unjust
court whose judgments are lies, and yet which has the power to cause
great harm. This is what the Sages teach us in their midrash on the
words, "Do not go about as a talebearer among your countrypeople."
Rabbi Mordechai Breuer, winner
of the 1999 Israel Prize for Torah Literature, teaches at Yeshivat Har
Etzion in Alon Shvut.
A reaction to the article by Eli Willchick, Shabbat Shalom 76:
Eli Willchick dealt with the famous question of why
the name of Moses does not appear in the Passover Haggadah. Basing
himself on the fact that familiar personalities are not called by name
in the Torah portion of Shemot, Willchick argues that this is because
these figures do not represent themselves, but rather their nation. He
also says that this is done in order that the lessons learned from
their actions will be pertinent rather than personal. Therefore,
explains Willchick, our identification with the Exodus from Egypt
might have been lessened had Moses been mentioned in the Haggadah,
because: (a) "Since we do not know Moses, we cannot picture ourselves
as part of the story," and (b) We may come to think that the miracles
and wonders took place because of Moses, when actually, the hero of
the story is the entire nation. Willchick also argues that even
though Moses' name actually appears in the portion of Shemot, we
should still conclude (since other names are missing) that Moses was
born and attained his stature by virtue of these "anonymous
individuals"; if these individuals had acted differently, Moses would
not have been born and not have attained his stature.
1. "We do not know Moses." – What sort of
argument is this? We know Moses from the same source that we know
about the Exodus from. Have we "been privileged" (in the author's
words) to know the nation, but not Moses?2. Willchick draws his conclusion from small
selections in the portion of Shemot in which certain figures are not
mentioned by name. However, in Shemot itself and in many other
portions where these figures appear, they are mentioned by name
numerous times. In the portion of Va'era (Ex. 6:14-28) the Torah
takes the trouble to interrupt the flow of the narrative in order to
list the exact names of all the "anonymous people," as well as many
others! So, if someone wishes to investigate, for example, why the
verse says "His sister stood" rather than "Miriam stood," we could
suggest that this is because as long as Moses' name has not been
mentioned, neither is Miriam's. But we could not argue that the
reason her name is not mentioned is that this is a "public,"
indefinite Miriam, because the text explicitly identifies her many
times.3. Willchick writes: "If the intent of the portion
of Shemot is to emphasize Moses' importance, then the lesson it
teaches is precisely this: A leader is born and attains stature by
virtue of anonymous individuals." Has Shemot "failed" in fulfilling
its intent, or is Willchick mistaken about the lesson? What is the
relevance of the presence or absence of names to the supposition that
if individuals had acted differently, Moses would have been different?
If Pharaoh's daughter had been mentioned by name, Willchick would
still have been able to suppose that had she not disobeyed her
father's orders, Moses would not have lived. Altogether, the
supposition itself is highly flawed: our imaginations can invent many
things that would have happpened if people had acted differently.4. Willchick cites the midrash "Do Moses hands
etc." as proof that Moses is not the hero of the Exodus story, but
rather the entire nation of Israel is the hero. But is this really
the lesson of the midrash? And how can one totally ignore the entire
period of Moses' leadership, from his standing before Pharaoh to his
guidance of the people during the Exodus and for forty years in the
desert, always exhibiting endless self-sacrifice and patience?5. The question of why Moses' name is missing from
the Haggadah is, as mentioned, famous. Many answers have been given,
one of which is similar to this discussion (but having a different
purpose): that the authors of the Haggadah wished to plant the hope
for redemption in the hearts of the nation living in exile. They left
Moses' name out in order that we not think that only Moses can bring
about redemption.6. A final note: Moses is mentioned in the
Haggadah, albeit only once. "…Rabbi Yosi the Galilean says: How do
we learn that the Egyptians were afflicted with ten plagues in
Egypt…and at the sea it is written: "The Israelites saw the great
hand…and believed in God and in Moses his slave."
Emanuel Shelo
Ra'anana
Eli Willchick responds:
Actually, I did not find these notes to be a direct
engagement with the arguments in my article. Rather, they concern
points incidental to the main issue. I will respond briefly to a
number of points:
1. Moses' name does in fact appear
once in the Haggadah, in the course of the discussion of the question
of how many plagues the Egyptians suffered at the sea, where the
following verse is brought in the name of Rabbi Yosi: "The Israelites
saw the great hand…and believed in God and in Moses his slave." In
spite of this, as Mr. Shelo points out, the quesion of why Moses' name
does not appear in the Haggadah is famous; it has been treated often
in the past and even in the present (see the article by Chaim Chefer
in Yediot Achronot, the seventh day of Passover). The reason for this
is that the mention of Moses' name is not brought as part of the story
of the Exodus, but rather is mentioned only incidentally, as part of a
quotation that is cited to address another topic.2. I emphasized in the article that the
portion of Shemot is characterized by the absence of names, in
contrast to the portions preceding it. This is true from after the
beginning of the portion, which deals with the names of Jacob's sons
who went down to Egypt. I tried to explain that the change which the
Torah makes is intended to emphasize the transition from stories about
individuals to the story of a nation, or in order to emphasize the
fact that, often, a leader is born and exists by virtue of the work of
anonymous individuals. This is what is unique about Shemot. The fact
that later portions mention some of these heroes by names does not
detract from the uniqueness of the portion of Shemot and the lesson we
can learn from it.3. Shelo argues that, in my article, I addressed
"if" and imaginary questions. With all due respect, I did not do this
at all. I did not argue that had the Torah revealed the names,
history would have been different. I claimed, and I still claim, that
concealing the names leads to a different attitude toward the story,
for better or for worse. I attempted to explain how I believe the
Torah wished us to relate to the story told in Shemot, and why it
chose the avenue of concealing the names.4. Did I really ignore Moses' leadership? But the
nation of Israel would have been redeemed in any event, in light of
the covenant God made with Abraham our patriarch. Moses was the means
which enabled the covenant to be fulfilled, by virtue of his greatness
and leadership. However, the "hero" of the story, then and forever,
is the nation of Israel and not one leader or another, not even
Moses.5. Ultimately, it seems that the commentary brought
by Shelo – according to which the reason that Moses is not named
in the Haggadah is in order to plant hope in the nation that
redemption will come even without Moses – expresses precisely
the same idea I did in my article. For "Everyone has to view oneself
as if they personally came out from Egypt"; this coming out is not
dependent of Moses. It is not clear to me why Shelo views the
interpretation he brought as "similar but having a different purpose."
Our best wishes to Rabbi Mordechai Breuer, member
of our movement, upon his being honored with the 1999 Israel Prize for
Torah Literature. This brings honor to our movement, to the Israel
Prize, and to the entire nation of Israel.