IF HIS OFFERING TO THE LORD IS A BURNT OFFERING OF BIRDS, HE SHALL CHOOSE HIS OFFERING FROM TURTLEDOVES OR PIGEONS.

(Vayikra 1:14)

 

From turtledoves or pigeons

Rabbi Abahu said: A person should always belong to those who are chased rather than to those who give chase, for the turtledove and pigeon are the most hunted of birds, and Scripture allows them [to be offered] on the altar.

(Bava Kama 93a)

 

From turtledoves or pigeons - Scripture chose these two species because they are common and more easily caught, as our Rabbis mentioned (in Vayikra Rabbah 27:6): the sheep and the goat - that he should make offerings from those which are raised by his trough thus sparing him from having to bear his weapons, his quiver and his bow, to hunt game to [have flesh to] bring [as an offering].

He wanted the large doves because of their famed chastity and devotion; if one loses its mate, it will never cling to another, and so Israel clings to the Lord their God, and will never cling to another god.

But the doves are very jealous, and in their jealousy, they will part and switch partners. That is why He chose only the young ones before they have mated, for the young dove increases love of the nest in which it grows more than do other birds.

Our Rabbi mentioned that if a person touches the nest of any other bird to takes eggs or chicks from it, the bird will desert it and never nest in it again, while the dove will not abandon its nest under any circumstances. So too, Israel will never replace its Creator and His Torah, but rather, "Either a Jew - or crucified" (Shemot Rabbah 42:9). He did not choose roosters because of their licentiousness.

(RaMBaN, ad loc)

 

In case it is a prince who incurs guilt

Happy is the Generation whose Prince brings an Offering for his Error

Ronen Ahituv

The laws of the sin-offering which are laid-out in our parasha invite discussion of the notions of sin and of halakhah in general. Let us here consider the fascinating topic called the "Bull of the hidden matter."

If it is the whole community of Israel that has erred and the matter escapes the notice of the congregation, so that they shall do any of the things which by the Lord's commandments ought not to be done, and they realize their guilt - when the sin through which they incurred guilt becomes known, the congregation shall offer a bull of the herd as a sin offering, and bring it before the Tent of Meeting. The elders of the community shall lay their hands upon the head of the bull before the Lord, and the bull shall be slaughtered before the Lord...(Vayikra 4:13-15)

According to the plain meaning of the text - and Ibn Ezra's commentary - this passage refers to a mistake committed by the entire community. Ibn Ezra believes that Aaron the High Priest, acting as the representative of halakhic tradition, informed them of their error. The Sages, however, interpret the passage differently:

community of Israel - the special community within Israel. What is that? It is the Great Sanhedrin, which sits in the Chamber of Hewn Stones. (Sifra, Dibura de'Hata'ot, 4:2)

The Sages state here that the error was committed by the halakhic leadership itself, and that it is not the High Priest who wields halakhic authority, but rather the Sages themselves in the form of the central institution known as "The Great Sanhedrin."

The Sages' discussion of this issue appears mostly in the first chapter of the tractate Horayot. They devote a great deal of space to the question of the status of the individual vis-à-vis the authority of the established court. Given the importance and relevance of that discussion, I shall present some of its conclusions. Later, I will consider a question that I feel arises out of the text, even though it is not touched upon by the Sages.

In regard to the matter at hand, the Sages distinguish between two types of people. The first can be referred to as the "innocents." Such people do not claim to know or understand the halakhah; they simply follow the instructions given them by the established authorities. To the extent that the establishment errs and misguides the innocents, the innocents are not obliged to offer a sacrifice. After all, the court was responsible for their mistake, and the court's offering atones for everyone who listened to it.

The second category is that of the critically-minded person. Whether such a person sits on the court himself or is merely a scholar worthy of giving halakhic instruction, and even if he is neither, but rather he is simply someone who does not make a habit of blindly accepting the court's rulings - that person is held responsible for his transgressions. The public offering does not grant him atonement.

If the critically-minded person understands that the ruling in question is mistaken, he is required to walk a very thin line. On the one hand, he is prohibited from instructing the public that - in practice - they must reject the court's ruling. If he were to do so, he would become a "rebellious elder." On the other hand, he is personally forbidden from following the mistaken ruling; the "commandment to obey the words of the Sages" does not apply to a mistaken ruling.

To the extent possible, the critically-minded person must be strict with himself and try to respect the requirements demanded by the court, as well as those stipulated by his own opinion. In many cases, however, it is difficult to distinguish between restrictive and permissive elements in halakhah. The critically-minded person is allowed to publicly teach his rulings as theoretical opinions that are not meant to be followed in practice. If the critically-minded man had explicitly presented his views before the court, telling them, "You are mistaken," the "innocent" is no longer free of his obligation to offer a sacrifice, even if the court had rejected the criticism. Even "innocents" are required to pay attention to minority opinions brought before the court and take them under consideration. In any event, the "innocent" has already lost his "innocence." This seems to imply that the Sages preferred the critical attitude towards the halakhah over the innocent attitude, and favored deliberative reflection over blind obedience.

Aside from the important social question treated here, our parasha gives rise to a more basic and fundamental question: How are we to define an "error?"

According to the Sages, the court is the highest authority on halakhic issues. In that case, it would seem that any ruling made by the court constitutes, ipso-facto, the halakhah, and any divergent opinion is mistaken. When, then, can the court itself be mistaken?

This question becomes even further vexing in the light of the Sages' many efforts to establish their own authority. The court's authority can sometimes even override the testimony of individuals regarding earlier halakhic opinions [see the incident involving Akavya ben Mehal'lel which is reported in Mishnah Eduyot 5:6-7]. It even overrides the authority of a voice [bat kol] from heaven [see the famous incident involving tanuro shel akhna'i in B. Bava Metzia 59a and J. Moed Katan 81c]. It goes without saying that the opinion of the High Priest and his traditions cannot overturn a decision of the court. Granted all of this, what could cause the court to recognize its error?

Furthermore: many textual sources seem to imply that many of the Sages did not think that it was their job to merely seek and discover the halakhah, but also to exercise their authority to follow their own judgment in determining the halakhah. That is how R. Yirmiyah understands the verse it is not in heaven (B. Bava Mitzia 59a): "The Torah was already given at Mount Sinai, so we pay no attention to a bat kol, since it was already written in the Torah at Sinai that [one must] follow the many (Shemot 23). In the Jerusalem Talmud [loc cit], R. Hanina says: "Ever since it [the Torah] was given, nothing [further] was given except follow the many. According to this view, which is close to post-modernism, there exists no concept of the court "erring." An error must be measured against some outer reality, and if there is no halakhic reality "outside" of the Sages' rulings, those rulings must be infallible!

Of course, it is possible to present alternative approaches to the notion of halakha and to return to the usual idea that the Sages simply investigate the intentions of He who gave the Torah. According to this approach, the Sages may come to discover that the Giver of the Torah intended a ruling different from that which they had offered, and admit their mistake. This approach allows for the formulation of rules of argument [e.g., regulating testimony of halakhic traditions, halakhic hermeneutics, etc.] that could show one halakhic opinion to be absolutely wrong, and replace it with an alternative opinion. As far as I know, no such rules were ever explicitly formulated. However, a least according to the opinion of one of the Sages cited above, the question still stands in all its force.

It seems that the solution to this problem comes together with a new interpretation of the notion of an "error." It is precisely because all authority is in the hands of the Sages that they are able to change their minds, establishing a ruling that is different from their earlier opinion. In such a case they themselves pronounce that their earlier view was an "error." "Error" is no longer an objective assertion, but rather a halakhic assertion, which, like any halakhic assertion, is subject to the judgment of the court's sages.

What could make the court's sages change their minds? As we have seen, conventional halakhic discourse is subordinate to the Sages' judgment. Therefore, the causes of halakhic paradigm change must be found outside the walls of the House of Study. They include social, intellectual, and economic changes. Such developments are likely to change the majority view in the court, causing them to retroactively designate their earlier opinion an "error" that must be atoned for with the offering of the "bull of the hidden matter."

May we know how to admit our mistakes and to repent from them whole-heartedly.

Dr. Ronen Ahituv is from Mitzpeh Netufa. He teaches at Bar Ilan University, Mideshet Oranim, and Kinneret College.

 

Domesticated and Wild Animals: Torah and Worship of God are Peace in the World

The fact that Scripture permitted the sacrifice of domesticated animals on the altar should further be interpreted as teaching the virtue of temimut [innocence, honesty] and that it is proper for a person to conduct himself in accordance with it, for the species of domesticated animals are tam, and they live in settled places. Our father Jacob chose them when his mother told him please, go to the flock (Bereishit 27), and he chose the virtue of peace, and was called a man who was tam, which is translated as a man of peace, and the Torah that was given to his descendents is entirely peace, for it says its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace (Proverbs 3), and Israel is called Shulamit [from the word shalom, peace], for it is said return, return o Shulamit (Song of Songs 7), for they are the nation in which resides eternal peace. Therefore, the Holy One blessed be He chose this species for sacrifice, because the sacrifices are peace in the world. He rejected the wild beasts, because the wicked Esau, estranged from the sun' light, was a hairy man, a man of the wilderness, as it is said skilled in hunting, a man of the field (Bereishit 25). He [Esau] chose the species of beast that dwells in the wilderness, a place of destruction and desolation. This is the opposite of the virtue of peace, and that is why the Torah kept hewn stones away from the altar, because iron is the sword that destroys the world, and it is Esau's inheritance, as it is written for you waved your sword over it and desecrated it (Shemot 20). Since the altar lengthens life and the sword cuts it short, the Sages taught regarding this "it is not logical that that which shortens should be waved over that which lengthens."

(Rabbeinu Behayeiy Vayikra 1:2)

 

We have already set forth their utility in summary fashion. Now we shall begin to give the reasons, as we have apprehended them, for the single commandments. We shall accordingly say that the Torah, according to the interpretation of Onkelos, states literally that the Egyptians used to worship the sign of Aries and they therefore forbade the slaughter of sheep and abominated shepherds. For it says: Lo, if we shall sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians (Shemot 8:22); and it says: For every shepherd is an abomination unto the Egyptians (Bereishit 46:34). Similarly certain sects of the Sabians worshipped the jinn and believed that they assumed the outward forms of goats and therefore called the jinn "goats." This teaching was very widespread in the time of Moses our Master: And they shall no more offer their sacrifices unto the goats [se'irim] and so on (Vayikra 17:7). Hence these sects also used to prohibit the eating of goats. As for the slaughter of oxen, nearly the majority of idolaters abominated it, as all of them held this species in very great esteem. Hence you will find that up to our time the Indians do not slaughter oxen, even in countries where other species of animals are slaughtered. Thus it was in order to efface the traces of these incorrect opinions we have been ordered by the Law to offer in sacrifices only these three species of quadrupeds: You shall bring your offering of oxen and of small cattle (Vayikra 1:2). In this way an action considered by them as an extreme act of disobedience was the one through which one came near to God and sought forgiveness for one's sins. Thus wrong opinions, which are diseases of the human soul, are cured by their contrary found at the other extreme.

With a view to the same purpose we have been commanded to slaughter the paschal lamb and to sprinkle with its blood in Egypt the gates from outside, so that we should manifest our rejection of these opinions, proclaim what is contrary to them, and bring forth the belief that the act, which they deemed to be a cause of destruction, saves from destruction: And the Lord will pass over the door, and will not suffer the destroyer to come in unto your houses to smite (Shemot 12:25). This is in recompense of their manifestation of obedience and their having put an end to the absurd things done by the idolaters. This is the reason for the choice of only these three species for sacrifice, over and beyond the fact that these are also domesticated species that are numerous, not as is the case in the cults of the idolaters who sacrifice lions, bears, and other wild animals, as is mentioned in the book of Tumtum.

(RaMBaM, Guide of the Perplexed III:46, Pines translation)

 

 

Who is Dependent Upon Whom: The Leadership Upon the People or Vice Versa?

If it is the anointed priest who has incurred guilt, le'ashmat ha'am [so that blame falls upon the people] (4:8). What is the meaning of the article le' in this verse?

There are two approaches to understanding this matter, which may be expressed in the words of the Sages: Does the generation - that is to say, the social, cultural and moral character of a certain population at a certain time - go according to the Prince (i.e., does the leadership determine the people's character)? Or does the Prince go with the people (the leadership is appropriate to the people)? Or as the nations of the world are wont to say, does each nation get the leaders it deserves?

And so, there are two interpretations of if it is the anointed priest who has incurred guilt, le'ashmat ha'am. It can mean that the priest's unintentional sin (i.e., the leadership's mistakes) cause the people to sin as well. That is to say, the sin of the anointed priest also incurs guilt for the people. Or it can be interpreted as saying that the people cause the priest to sin. That is to say, he sins because the people sins.

This returns us to a problem of profound social-political significance: Are the generation's faults to be blamed on the leadership? Or should we say that the character of the leadership reflects the character of the people? There is an important practical consequence to the way we answer these questions. In the one case, we can improve a situation by changing the leadership. In the other case, the people cannot be changed, and improvement would be dependent upon everyone's improving himself.

(Y. Leibowitz, He'arot le'Parshiyot Ha'shavu'a)

 

 

 

 

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