THERE SHALL NOT BE FOUND AMONG YOU ANYONE WHO PASSES HIS SON OR DAUGHTER THROUGH FIRE, A SOOTHSAYER, A DIVINER OF [AUSPICIOUS] TIMES, ONE WHO INTERPRETS OMENS, OR A SORCERER, OR A CHARMER, A PITHOM SORCERER, A YIDO'A SORCERER, OR A NECROMANCER.

(Devarim 18:10-11)

 

All these things are lies and falsehood, and with them the ancient idolaters misled the nations of the lands into following them, and it is not proper that Israel, who are very wise, should be attracted by these forms of foolishness; they should not even consider that they may have some substance, as is written, There is no divination in Jacob, and no augury in Israel, and it is written, For these nations that you are coming to possess: to sorcerers and augurers do they hearken, but you - not thus has the Lord your God made you!...

Whoever believes in all these things and their likes, thinking that they are true and are items of wisdom, but that the Torah forbade them, is but one of the fools and the ignorant... but those who possess wisdom and whose ideas are whole know with clear proof that all these things which the Torah forbade are not things of wisdom, but are empty and insubstantial, attracting those lacking in intelligence who abandoned all paths of truth because of them. . And this is why the Torah, when admonishing against all these forms of nonsense, said, Wholehearted shall you be with the Lord your God.

(RaMBaM, Mishneh Torah, "Laws of Idolatry" 11:16)

 

I know that you shall search and find the words of some individuals from the Sages of truth, our Rabbis of blessed memory in the Talmud, the Mishnah, and the midrashim, whose words state that when a person is born the stars determined this and that. Do not let this trouble you, for it is not proper to set aside practiced law in order to search for contradictions and explanations, and similarly it is not proper for someone to set aside items of knowledge whose truth has already been demonstrated through proofs and to depend on the idiosyncratic opinions of an individual sage, peace be upon him, since it could be that something escaped him at that moment [when he made the statement], or that his statement is metaphorical or stated only for that moment, or it was made in the context of a particular incident. See how there are even several verses in the Torah that cannot be read literally, and the translator [Onkelos] rendered them in a fashion that makes sense. A person should never cast his mind behind him, since the eyes are found in the front rather than the back, and I have already expressed my opinion regarding this.

(From RaMBaM's Epistle to the Marseille community)

 

Who are the Kings? Our Rabbis!

Ariel Rathous

The passage dealing with the zaken mamrei ["rebellious elder"] in parashat Shoftim contains the great principle establishing the authority of the sages of the Great Court to make directives and rulings, as is stated in the verse: Act according to the law [Torah] that they instruct you and the judgment that they tell you, do not deviate from the word they tell you to the right or the left (Devarim 17:11).

We have received two different derashot on the last part of this verse. In the Talmud Yerushalmi we read:

Could it be that if they tell you right is left and left is right that you should heed them? [Rather,] we learn from the verse: the right or the left - [You must listen to them] when they tell you that right is right and left is left. (Horayot 1:1)

Sifri (Devarim 24) explicates the right or the left differently: "Even if they teach you that right is left and left right, listen to them."

It is hardly necessary to point out that these derashot contradict each other and express antithetical views on the relationship between the individual Israelites and the system of halakhic decision making. It seems that according to the Yerushalmi a person is obligated to maintain clear thinking and judge each matter on its own merits and in light of his own knowledge of Torah and halakhah; then he must accept the Sages' decision inasmuch as it does not contradict the axioms of his own knowledge. The Sifri, in contrast, seems to grant the Sages unlimited authority to make decisions and it forces others to accept those decisions, even when they contradict other established principles. The Sages can tell those who disagree with them that right is left and vice-versa, and even though they are clearly wrong - the others must surrender their common sense and obey them. True, the Vilna Gaon did bring a slightly different version of this dictum, which reads: "Even if it seems to you that [that they are calling] left right and right left, listen to them." This version emphasizes the subjective nature of the interpretation made by one who disagrees with the Sages rather than the objective error made by the Sages themselves; accordingly, it has been adopted by those who want to moderate the extreme position expressed by the canonical version (see, for instance, R. Brukh haLevi Epstein's comments in his Torah Temimah on the verse in question: "And we have copied the Vilna Gaon's version, which is the correct formulation." The Malbim also uses this amended version). However, the dictum remains rather problematic even after the emendation. It seems the Sifri is telling us that every absurd and groundless ruling of the Great Court must be accepted as Torah from Heaven.

The Sifri's dictum has been a favorite of commentators and darshanim; for generations it has been quoted frequently, so much so that it has become one of the source texts for emunat hakhamim ["faith in the Sages"] in its more general sense. Rashi cites it in his commentary, and RaMBaN discusses it at length in his own commentary on the verse:

Even if they teach you that right is left and left right... The intent: even if you think in your heart that they are mistaken and this fact is as obvious to you as you know your left from your right, you shall do as they command. And do not say, "How can I eat this pure helev [nonkosher fat] or kill this innocent man?" But rather say: "Thus I have been commanded by the commanding Master, that I perform all His commandments in accordance with the instructions of those standing before Him in the place of His choosing. The Torah was given to me according to how their minds understand it, even if they are wrong. And so it was in the incident involving R. Yehoshua and R. Gamliel on the date of Yom Kippur according to the former's calculations... For the Lord's spirit is upon those who serve in His Temple and He shall never desert His pious ones, guarding them from error and stumbling blocks.

This passage invites a number of questions. Does RaMBaN mean to say that one must never in any way question the Sages' pronouncements, even if only to examine their rulings and to criticize them when such criticism seems justified? He employs the expression al tomar - "do not say" (in contrast to his earlier formulation afilu tahshov belibkha ["even if you think in your heart"]), which seems to strengthen this interpretation, and it can be understood as referring to critical speech. If that is the way things stand, we have no choice but to ask a more urgent question: RaMBaN cites the famous case of Raban Gamliel who ordered R. Yehoshua to desecrate the day which the latter had calculated to be Yom Kippur (Mishnah Rosh HaShanah 2:9). He also offers an example of an outlandish legal ruling: a court which permits the eating of something which appears to be helev. However, while both of these cases involve very serious prohibitions, no human lives are in the balance. How are we supposed to stand idly and silently by as "this innocent man" is killed? Who will restore life to the killed man if it later becomes clear that his death sentence was actually mistaken? Can such behavior be possible or desirable in terms of the Torah's morality? Can a society be called just when it does without criticism of what appears to be unnecessary bloodshed?

In the end of his comment, RaMBaN explains that the Holy Spirit rests upon the Sages and saves them from "error and stumbling blocks." This approach closes the gap between hakham and navi [sage and prophet], thus justifying the Sifri. But doesn't it involve an over-idealization of the Sages' process of decision making?

In his comments on the verse do not deviate from the word they tell you to the right or the left , the Meshekh Hokhmah (R. Meir Simkha MiDvinsk) takes a position quite different from that of the RaMBaN. He discusses the RaMBaM's claim that the transgression of any rabbinic commandment involves a infringement of do not deviate, taking the opportunity to offer a very clear understanding of rabbinical authority. The Sages are granted this authority in order to avoid a situation in which "the Torah is given over to each individual, and they will form many factions, and the general bond will fall apart." Therefore, those who do not obey the Sages "transgress [the commandment] do not deviate. However, that does not mean that every specific ruling and edict is itself correct and true, rather, "The substance of their decision and innovation may not be acceptable to the Creator's will." Meshekh Hokhmah brings an interesting and surprising example to clarify this point:

We found an example of this in the Torah relating to a similar matter, that the Torah was stricter about obeying the king than about obeying the Sages, and [one who does not obey the king] may be killed... nonetheless, Shimi ben Gera, for example, was commanded by God to obey Solomon and not leave the city's walls and was killed for this - but did God want Solomon to say that, was this detail in accordance with His will? Why would God care if he left [the city]? If only Solomon had not uttered this [command] and had not created conditions that led to his taking Pharaoh's daughter as a wife, which in turn brought the destruction of the Temple and Israel's exile! It is in this way that the Torah made a law requiring the Israelites to obey the Sages as if they were a king - "Who are kings? - Our Rabbis" - but that does not mean that His will agrees with their particular commands.

Solomon did not kill Shimi ben Gera, who had cursed his father David with an outrageous insult (I Kings 2:8); rather, he first limited his freedom, commanding him not to leave Jerusalem. Shimi obeys the king for three years, but then is tempted into leaving the city in order to chase two fugitive slaves. For this Solomon commands his death (ibid., 36-46). Meshekh Hokhmah explains this biblical story in a manner very critical of Solomon, basing himself on the Gemara which links Shimi's death with Solomon's marriage to Pharaoh's daughter (Berakhot 8a), and the claim that "the great city of Rome," which was destined to eventually destroy the Temple, was founded on their wedding day (Shabbat 56b).

The king's actions are not protected from criticism, and apparently the analogy mentioned above would suggest that neither are the Sages' rulings beyond criticism. Just as we are allowed to say, in accordance with our limited understanding, that God would not have minded if Shimi left Jerusalem, and that it was unfair for him to be killed for it, so too we may examine the Sages' rulings in the light of our own minds, understanding, and conscience. Meshekh Hokhmah takes the well-known expression, "Who are the kings? Our Rabbis!" in its literal sense. For him it is not just a nice bit of rhetoric aimed at honoring the Sages, but rather the expression of a significant equivalence of kings with the Sages. This equivalence means, among other things, that there is an earthly, instrumental, and political (and therefore human and arbitrary) aspect to the Sages' rulings, and that it is proper for us to express our opinions about those rulings.

None of this undermines the foundations of rabbinical authority; what does change is the way we relate to the words of the Sages.

In the passage cited above, the RaMBaN places the process of halakhic decision meaning beyond our judgment, because the Holy Spirit does not rest upon us. We must accept their rulings in silence, even if we think innocent blood is being shed. Meshekh Hokhmah, in contrast, thinks of the Sages being a kind of statesman (like a king); they have the right to govern but do not have the right to claim a monopoly on the truth. Solomon's machinations which led to Shimi's death were not desired by God, and so, similarly, certain rulings of the Sages may not be desired by God.

The latter approach seems to oblige us to stand guard and refuse to surrender our powers of judgment. We must relate to the decisions of the Sages with appreciation and respect, but also with a critical eye. Above all we must verify that, as the Yerushalmi puts it, they call right right and left left.

Dr. Ariel Rathaus is a literary scholar and translator.

 

Power's Seduction

Shmuel Moreshet and Yosef Ahituv

In parashat Shoftim, the Torah placed three prohibitions upon the king (Devarim 17:16-17):

Only, he may not acquire many horses for himself, so that he will not bring the people back to Egypt in order to acquire many horses, for the Lord said to you, "You shall not return that way any more."

 And he shall not take many wives for himself, and his heart must not turn away, and he shall not acquire much silver and gold for himself.

These three commandments point to the dangers which might and power bring with them. Rulership necessarily grants might and power to those who possess it. Without these, the ruler cannot fulfill his function; in contrast to the prophet and the sage, the ruler is responsible for the proper and continuous operation of the social and political systems. He cannot allow himself to make do with chaotic, indecisive and hesitant management. His role and responsibilities will not allow him to be "long-suffering." He must apply force when necessary in order to maintain proper order. To that end he is granted the authority to use force, while the prophet must be satisfied with offering warnings and alarms, hoping that his audience might internalize them and reach the appropriate operative conclusions. The sage, the man of spirit - and like him, the educator - must exercise patience and watch as the lengthy and occasionally unpredictable process takes place by which the wisdom and values he teaches are internalized until his audience finally translates them into deeds and lifestyles.

However, the king's power also tempts him to misuse power, especially in the form of unnecessary wars devoted to territorial expansion and the pursuit of wealth.

Horses are strategic weapons, especially when they are harnessed to war-chariots and are steered by military charioteers. The Israelites had already met up with such chariots at the Red Sea, and who knows what would have happened there had it not been for God's salvation and the miracles He performed.

If so - why not acquire many of them? In order to keep the king from being tempted to wage unnecessary wars.

The king of Israel is allowed and perhaps even required to maintain horses for defensive purposes, but he is prohibited from acquiring a great number of them, lest his military might overtake defensive needs and awaken in him the desire to wage unnecessary wars of conquest.

This tack can also be taken regarding the prohibition against the king taking many foreign wives, marriages which were usually of a political nature and undertaken as an expression and consequence of military alliances. These could also draw the king into other people's wars, involving him in the conflicts and political interests of his allies/fathers-in-law.

Economic power can also draw the king into wars that have nothing to do with the existential interests of the people and kingdom.

Thus, these three commandments addressed to the king can be viewed as opposed to warfare; they come to warn against megalomania.

It is worth while to mention two contemporary rabbis, each of whom restricts the permissibility of optional wars in his own way. R. Shlomo Yosef Zevin¹ writes that the nations of the world also lack any halakhic permission to wage optional wars, and he concludes:

It seems certain that Noahides are prohibited from waging aggressive wars, which are also called optional wars [milhemet reshut]. Do not murder! These were only permitted to Israel in special circumstances: [they had to be waged] by a king, and with the permission of the Great Sanhedrin of seventy-one members. Since the nations of the world can never fulfill the requirement of having a Sanhedrin [approve the war], on what basis can it [an optional war] be allowed?

In his article, "Shikulim Musariyim BeNosei HaMilhamah" ("Moral considerations in the matter of war")², R. Avraham Tzvi Rabinowitz bases the permissibility of waging an optional war on the principle of hora'at sha'a [a temporary edict overriding the usual halakhic laws]. In this he claims to be following HaRav Kook. Permission to kill in war is derived from the law of the pursuer [din rodef], according to which "anyone who can save [the person being pursued by his intended murderer] at the cost of [the pursuer] losing one of his limbs but instead kills him [kills the pursuer instead of using non-lethal force] is a spiller of blood." The upshot of using this law as the basis for understanding optional wars is that even in times of war it is impermissible to shed blood except as a direct consequence of the situation of combat, and that even in times of war there is no a priori permission to shed blood. R. Rabinowitz writes:

Now, think of it yourself, that even in the case of one who pursues his fellow in order to kill him, and his blood is permitted [to be shed] by everyone, and the prohibition against blood shed has been uprooted in his case, even so - if the pursued person or a third party can prevent him [the pursuer] from carrying out his evil wishes by [merely] injuring and the like [but instead kills him], he is subject to the penalty of death carried out by God. This demonstrates that even in his case the principle [prohibiting bloodshed] is not completely nullified by the Torah, and this conclusion - according to the Shiyarei Korban - is applicable to the situation of war as well.

This is also the conclusion that derives in his opinion from the notion that the permissibility of an optional war is based upon hora'at sha'a. If "the foundation of the permissibility of a war is founded upon hora'at sha'a" then that granting of permission "does not fundamentally overturn the prohibition against bloodshed, but rather permits [killing] only at a particular time and for a particular goal."

[1]. R. S. Y. Zevin, Le'Or HaHalakha Tel-Aviv 5717, "HaMilhamah", "A - Hukiyut HaMilhamah," pp. 9-18.

2. In the book Arakhim BeMivhan HaMilhamah, pp. 41-53, and especially 51-52.

Dr. Shemuel Moreshet was a researcher in Rehovot's Vulcani Institute

Yosef ("Yoska") Ahituv is a member of Kibbutz Ein Tzurim

 

 

 

 

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