WHEN YOU BUILD A NEW HOUSE,

YOU ARE TO MAKE A PARAPET FOR YOUR ROOF,

THAT YOU NOT PUT BLOOD-GUILT ON YOUR HOUSE

IF SOMEONE FALLING FALLS FROM IT.

(Devarim 22:8)

 

Is Everything in God's Hands?

"If someone falling falls from it" - this person deserved to fall, but even so let his death not be caused by you, because merit is awarded through the meritorious and retribution through the guilty.

(Rashi, Devarim 22:8)

 

Animals and souls, constellations and spheres and angels, all are in God's hands (Rambam's Epistle to the Proselyte), that is to say, all the natural order. The conclusion, therefore, is that davka because "everything is in God's hands", i.e., because the laws of nature are immutable, one must erect a parapet, thereby preventing gravitation from causing that man to fall and be smashed.

 (Y. Leibowitz, Seven Years of Discussion of the Weekly Parasha, p. 867)

 

 

 

THE UGLY AND THAT WHICH RESEMBLES THE UGLY

Ronen Achituv

 

"Ki TETSEH" is one of those parashot rich in mitzvoth. We shall deal with one of these mitzvoth, one which may shed light on the processes of halachic thinking in general:

There is to be no cult prostitute of the daughters of Israel, there is to be no cult prostitute of the sons of Israel.

You are not to bring the fee of a whore or the price of a dog to the house of the Lord your God, for any vow; for an abomination to the Lord your God are the two of them! (Devarim 23:18-19)

The second of these verses forbids bringing a harlot's fee to the Holy Place, i.e., to offer a lamb purchased with her fee. Why was the bringing of a whore's fee to the Temple forbidden—the lamb, after all, is pure and innocent?

This question may be answered in two ways, depending on the meaning we ascribe to the word "kedesha" [cult prostitute] in verse 18.

A.   The kedesha is a temple prostitute (see I Kings 14:24) - a harlot whose fee is intended for the temple. It is not prostitution as such which is forbidden; it is that prostitution which is temple-related. If the whore's fee is always given to the temple, she becomes a kedesha. In order to prevent this, the fee is disallowed, even as a one-time donation. So explains Hartoum.

B.   'Kedesha' is a general term for all prostitutes. Prostitution is an abomination and is forbidden. Not only is it in itself forbidden; it is forbidden to bring its remuneration to the Holy Place. The latter law is 'a parapet' [s'yag], a preventative measure which expresses the loathing of prostitution, which adheres also to the payment making it, too, an abomination. The phrase "price of a dog" appears to support this explanation, according to which the loathing is not of the payments and the fee, but of prostitution and the dog. (See, however, Abarbanel's view that the 'dog' is the male prostitute). The prohibition against the fee derives not from an inherent defect, but from it's originating in harlotry, which is loathsome.

The two explanations have differing halachic ramifications: the first implies a degree of halachic leniency in dealing with the prohibition of prostitution, limiting the ban to cult prostitution; the second interpretation demands a stringent approach to all prostitution.

There are also important differences regarding the term 's'yag' - the preventative measure. The first explanation would limit the prohibition to the specified act or item and its possible causes - not to its effects. This approach deals with the subject proper, relating to an effective method of preventing prostitution. According to the second explanation, one must distance himself not only from that which is in itself forbidden, he must also distance himself from its results and effects. The conception is that the prohibition is 'infectious', spreading to all its surroundings, just like tum'ah - ritual impurity. The prohibition does not concern itself with the inherent nature of the subject itself; the payment is unacceptable because of its source, i.e., because of its context, not because of its essence.

Let us attempt to understand Chazal's attitude to the question of the s'yag, as seen in the midrash.

"You are not to bring the fee of a whore or the price of a dog to the house of the Lord your God" - exempting [use of such monies for purchase of] the red heifer [the hattat heifer whose ashes were used in the purification of the death tum'ah], which does enter the House, these are the words of R'Eliezer. The Sages say: [These words are] to include even the hammered sheets. (Sifri Devarim, Piska 261)

We have before us two derashot on the words "the House of the Lord your God". R' Eliezer's exposition limits the prohibition to objects brought as an offering to the Temple (thus excluding the red heifer, which is not a Temple sacrifice). The derasha qualifies the ban against the harlot's fee, limiting its application. The other derasha, "to include the hammered sheets" widens the application, forbidding Temple use of all items acquired with harlot's fee or dog's payment, even if they are used not for sacrifices but for the hammered sheets and for the building of the Temple. According to this derasha, a harlot's fee may not be used even for the hammered sheets, and the degree of prohibition exceeds even the fire pans used by Korach's assembly and the mirrors of the women's working force. (Compare Bemidbar 17:3; Shemot 38:8)

R' Eliezer does not delight in expanding prohibitions; wherever possible he permits everything which the Torah does not expressly prohibit. The Sages, on the other hand, widen the prohibition, forbidden the bringing of anything which represents prostitution into the temple compound.

It is against this background that the following aggadah should be read:

When R' Eliezer was apprehended on a charge of heresy, he was brought up to the gallows for judgment.

Said the judge: That an old man like yourself should deal with such idle talk [words of heresy]!?

He replied: I trust the judge.

The judge thought: "He is talking about me". Actually he was referring to his Father in Heaven.

He said to him: Since you trusted in me, you are pardoned, you are free to go.

When he came home, his disciples came to console him [because of his being accused of heresy], but he refused to be consoled.

Said to him R' Akiva: Rebbi, will you permit me to recite before you something which you once taught me? He replied: Speak.

He said: Rebbi, perhaps some heretical thought gave you pleasure, and because of it you were found guilty by divine law?

He said: Akiva, now you have reminded me. Once I was walking in the upper market of Zippori, and I found a man who was a disciple of Jesus of Nazareth and his name was Yaakov of Kfar Sachya. He said to me: In your Torah it is written (Devarim 23:19): "You are not to bring the fee of a whore or the price of a dog to the house of the Lord your God". Does the law permit using them to make a privy [beyt kissey]for the high priest? I did not answer him.

He said to me: Thus did Jesus of Nazareth teach me (Micah 1:7): "For they were amassed from fees for harlotry, and they shall become harlots' fees again". They [the harlot's fee and the dog's price] originated in filth, they shall return to a place of filth. I enjoyed this thought, and because of this was I accused of heresy, and this is because I transgressed that which is written in the Torah (Proverbs 5): "Keep yourself far away from her; do not come near the doorway of her house.

The Roman judge levels at R' Eliezer the strange accusation that he is a Christian. R' Eliezer was prepared to give up his life for his Jewish faith, but because of a misunderstanding, he was spared. R' Eliezer's words "I trust in the judge" were directed at The Holy One, Blessed Be He, before whom he considered himself judged. He intended to justify the decree and say that even though he was about to die, he had no complaints about divine justice. The Roman judge understood his words as a statement of trust and belief in Caesar and the Roman regime, and as discarding the rule of Heaven, not only in the Christian sense, but perhaps also in the Jewish sense, and therefore he released him. It is no wonder that R' Eliezer viewed the unexpected deliverance with feelings of mourning and of grief.

This misunderstanding revealed to R' Eliezer the insight that one cannot always act as though he is standing only before God. He must also take into consideration the human environment and the way in which people are liable to interpret his actions. Therefore R' Eliezer regrets his conversation with Yaakov the Christian. There was nothing intrinsically wrong with this conversation, but in the eyes of the congregation it was interpreted as coming close to Christianity, it was perceived as a validation of it, and therefore he should not have conducted the conversation.

The Talmud sees the subject matter of the discussion between R' Eliezer and Yaakov as dealing with the question of the s'yag. First of all, both parties agree that erection of a privy within Temple bounds should not be proscribed. This should not be taken for granted. In our parasha we read (Devarim 23:14), "An area you should have outside the camp where you may relieve yourself". This commandment is liable to be interpreted as expressing the view that a privy on the Temple premises adversely affects the sanctity of the entire camp. The Dead Sea colonies deduced from this that the erection of a privy is prohibited in all Yerushalayim. But R' Eliezer and Yaakov the Christian concur that we must refrain from exaggerated use of the s'yag, and they agree that it is permissible to establish a privy on the Temple site itself.

Yaakov deals with the subject of the harlot's fee, and here, too, R' Eliezer is in concurrence. Yaakov permits the use of a harlot's fee for purpose of erecting a privy for the high priest. R' Eliezer also takes a lenient position on the harlot's fee, permitting its use for everything which is not in the category of a sacrifice, including, it appears, "hammered plates". All the more so for a privy, which is a place of filth.

The conversation itself is not considered by R' Eliezer to be a sin, and until R' Akiva's remarks he sees no fault in it. He acts in accord with his general approach of not prohibiting something because of its source and its place, but only according to its essence and its content. Yaakov, in this conversation, engaged in words of Torah, which, in themselves, have no flaw—and these, too, are consistent with R' Eliezer's halachic stand. There was nothing 'Christian' about the conversation, and as far as R' Eliezer was concerned, there was no reason to fault Yaakov's words because of his (Yaakov's) beliefs; he spoke words of substance.

At the conclusion of his conversation with R' Akiva, R' Eliezer voices remorse, accepting the approach which says that context must be taken into consideration, as per his words in the Tosefta (Chullin 2:24) "One should always flee from the ugly—and from that which resembles the ugly". True, most of R' Eliezer's dicta are not consonant with this conclusion, but the aggadah tells us that R' Eliezer apparently changed his mind, and perhaps he changed his mind with regard to the laws of the red heifer, etc.

It should be emphasized, however, that R' Eliezer's consideration of public opinion is only tactical. He does indeed recognize the weight of public opinion, and he understands that his disregard of it was a mistake, but as regards the halachic bottom line, he does not deviate one whit - exaggeration in legislating s'yagim should be avoided, issues should be judged according to their essence and not according to their contexts.

The Talmudic sugya supports the view that it is possible, by a slow and gradual process, to educate the public to differentiate between a basilica and a gallows (even though both were erected by goyim), between a bet kissey and a bet mikdash (even though both are located on the same site) between the heifer of purification and a sacrifice, between words of Torah and words of heresy.

If only we could instill in our public the Talmudic approach of unprejudiced examination, of abstention from proscription and de-legitimization of opinions, people, books, and words of Torah on the basis of their source and their affiliation.

 Ronen Achituv, from Mitzpeh Netofah in the Lower Gallilee, is a fellow in the Oranim Midrasha

 

 

"Take Care Against Anything Evil": Ethical Behavior in Times of Ordeal

"When a camp goes out to battle" - Even though you go out of the boundaries of routine family and civic life when you are in a military camp prepared for war against you enemies (the Sifrei emphasizes "against your enemies" - you wage war against your enemies". The Torah assumes that you will fight only those who have shown themselves to be your enemies, that you suffered from their fathers and anticipated hostile acts, therefore even when you attack them, take care of yourself; these words negate all wars of conquest), and therefore even when you are in a military camp, where moral constraints are easily loosened and the goal of war itself contributes to unbridled coarseness—even then "Take care against anything evil" - do not cease to test yourself as you practice self-control, and be careful to protect yourself "against anything evil."

 (Rabbi Shimshon Rafael Hirsch, Commentary on Devarim 23:10)

 

The War Against Amalek—Joint Battle of The Holy One, Blessed Be He, and Man Against Evil

Said R' Yehoshua ben Levi in the name of R' Alexandri: One verse says "Blot out the memory of Amalek" and another says "for I shall blot out" - how can both be fulfilled?

                                                                                              (Tanchuma, Ki Tetseh 11)

 

It must be emphasized that in its wider meaning, the 'war against Amalek' is the war against injustice and evil in the world, tied from Creation to the human nature of all men. In this respect, Israel is no different from all other nations of the world and peoples of all lands.

'Amalek' is not only a term for that person or nation that attacked Israel as they exited Egypt; the 'Amalek' that Israel is commanded to obliterate is the symbol of evil and injustice, that Amalekism which the Torah, in our parasha, precedes with "It is abomination before God, all who do these, all who practice injustice".

From this we derive that this is a milchemet mitzvah - an obligatory war - incumbent not on Israel alone; it is even a war of God against Amalek", and as such it is in its very essence an eternal war, and therefore it is expressed as a war "from generation to generation". This also explains the appearance of "I will obliterate" and "You will obliterate"; it is an eternal war waged by God and his people as one.

(Y. Leibowitz , Seven Years of Discussions on the Weekly Parasha, p. 877)

 

Evil Is Not Biological and Is Not Hereditary

It was taught [in a berayta]: Naaman was a resident alien (ger toshav); Nebuzaradan was a righteous proselyte (ger tsedek); the descendents of Haman taught Torah in B'nei Barak; descendents of Sisra taught children in Yerushalayim; descendents of Sancheriv taught Torah in public. And who were these [descendents of Sancheriv]? Shmaaya and Avtalyon.

                                                                                      (Bavli, Gittin 57b)

 

 

 

Editorial Board: Pinchas Leiser (Editor), Miriam Fine (Coordinator), Itzhak Frankenthal and Dr. Menachem Klein

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